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Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that an important determinant of subjective well-being
is how an individual’s consumption compares with that of their immediate peers. We
introduce peer comparisons into the standard optimal tax framework and demonstrate
that the optimal linear tax expression is adjusted in three key ways, the latter two of
which are novel to this paper and act to lower the tax rate. First, the dependence of
well-being on peer income introduces an externality that distorts labour supply above
that which individuals would choose were they to recognise the interplay between their
own choices and the Nash equilibrium level of peer consumption. The optimal tax rate
is adjusted upwards to (partially) correct this distortion. Second, if individual labour
supply is a function of peer consumption, there are ‘Keeping up with the Joneses’
multiplier effects that raise the Nash compensated labour supply elasticity above the
individual labour supply elasticity. This implies a lower tax rate on efficiency grounds.
Third, Nash indirect well-being is decreasing in the wage rate for workers with wages
close to the reservation wage. To the extent that this lowers the covariance between
gross earnings and the net social marginal value of income, this will act to lower the
optimal tax rate.
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 1 Introduction
It is increasingly recognised that public economic theory should incorporate important in-
sights from the extensive literature on subjective well-being; in particular the finding that rel-
ative income considerations are a key driver of subjective well-being (Layard, 2006; O’Donnell
et al., 2014). Doing so will provide richer frameworks in which to analyse important policy
questions. This paper aims to respond to these recommendations and is concerned with a
policy question at the heart of public economics: how do the conventional results from the
optimal linear income tax framework change when individuals care about their own con-
sumption relative to that of their peers? In particular, how does the optimal tax rate and
transfer depend on the extent to which relative income concerns affect individual well-being
and in turn social social welfare? We aim to answer this question in a very general framework
that nests the traditional approach as a special case.
Crucially, one can treat relative income considerations solely as (i) a pure negative externality
that lowers individual well-being but has no direct behavioural effect; or (ii) as a negative
externality and an argument of labour supply, such that the level of peer consumption has
a direct behavioural effect. Empirical evidence suggests the behavioural effect is important
(Pe´rez-Asenjo, 2011). Intuitively, the separability assumptions one employs will determine
which of these effects relative income considerations have. The second, more general form,
has not been adequately explored in the literature.
Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) treat relative income considerations as a pure negative ex-
ternality: preferences over consumption are separable from peer consumption, whilst the
disutility of effort is measured in consumption units. Accordingly, individual choices are
independent of the level of peer consumption. The pure negative externality is corrected for
by a having a higher tax rate than would otherwise have been the case. Their model thus
ignores an important facet of having individuals care about relative income - namely that
it induces Keeping up with the Joneses (henceforth KUJ ) behaviour that causes individuals
to overwork. More recently, Layard (2006) employs more general preferences where relative
income considerations do cause individuals to overwork, and where this can be corrected
for by a (Pigovian) tax on income. However, the author assumes that all individuals are
identical and so abstracts from redistributive considerations. The sole purpose for taxation
is to correct the labour distortion.
In this paper we develop a highly general framework for examining the policy implications
of relative income concerns, in which (i) peer consumption can have both a direct negative
effect on welfare and induce a KUJ labour supply effect. We show that there are then a
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 number of additional effects at work that have not been fully recognised in discussions of
optimal tax policy, and that these point towards lower tax rates than suggested thus far in
the literature on subjective well-being.
In introducing relative income concerns into a model where individuals differ in their abil-
ity/productivity, the first issue to address is to who individuals compare themselves with.
There is now considerable empirical evidence that individuals compare themselves with those
to whom they are very similar, e.g. work colleagues (see Clark and Senik, 2010; Knight et al.,
2009; Senik, 2009). Accordingly, we assume throughout that individuals compare themselves
to others with the same level of productivity (gross wage rate). We also make the standard
assumption that, in making their labour supply decisions, individuals take as given the aver-
age income of their peers. Taken together, these two assumptions mean that for every wage
rate we have to determine the Nash equilibrium levels of labour supply and consumption.
We in turn establish four key properties of these equilibrium levels that are very different
from the conventional properties of labour supply.
(i) Inefficiency of equilibrium labour supply. For every wage rate the Nash equilibrium level
of labour supply is inefficient because individuals treat the average income of their peers
as fixed and so fail to recognise the externality that their behaviour collectively imposes
on their peers. This just generalises the conclusion of Layard (2006) to the case where
individuals differ in their productivity.
(ii) Well-being decreases with the wage rate for those of low productivity. For wages above
but close to the reservation wage, well-being is a decreasing function of the wage rate.
This arises because an increase in the wage rate has two effects: (a) by Roy’s identity
it increases income and hence well-being at a rate proportional to hours of work; but
(b) it also increases the average consumption of the peer group and so exacerbates
the negative distortionary impact of peer consumption on well-being. This first effect
is close to zero when the wage rate is close to the reservation wage because labour
supply is close to zero. This implies that the individuals in society who are worst-off
are no longer those with the lowest productivity, nor are they the unemployed. This
generalises the conclusions in Ulph (2014) to a very general utility function.
(iii) Marginal indirect utility of income and the wage rate. The marginal utility of income
may not decrease with the wage rate: so both the absolute level of well-being and the
marginal impact of income on well-being may move in different directions from the
standard theory.
(iv) Multiplier Effects arising from the KUJ phenomenon. When preferences over individual
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 consumption and leisure are non-separable from peer income - such that KUJ effects
are at work on labour supply - there are important multiplier effects that drive the
compensated Nash labour supply elasticity above the individual compensated labour
supply elasticity1.
We show that the traditional formula for the optimal income tax rate - which captures the
equity-efficiency tradeoff inherent in income taxation2 - gets modified in three key ways:
(a) Distortion-Correcting Role. In relation to (i) above there is a new positive term capturing
the aggregate value of the distortion to labour supply relative to the net social marginal
value of income (smvi). This indicates the extent to which the optimal tax should be
increased to correct the externalities induced by relative income considerations.
(b) Muted equity considerations. Due to (ii) above the net smvi may fall less rapidly with
rapidly with productivity. To the extent that this lowers the covariance between gross
earnings and the net smvi, this may lessen equity considerations and act to lower the
optimal tax rate. This will depend on the distributional weights employed in the social
welfare function: in particular whether or not weight is given to inequality in utility
levels. In addition, (iii) above may affect how the net smvi changes with productivity,
in turn adjusting equity considerations.
(c) Heightened Efficiency considerations. Due to the multiplier effects in (iv) above the
distortionary costs of income taxation are increased, thus acting to lower the tax rate.3
Whilst the first effect implies that the optimal tax rate should be higher than the traditional
policy considerations would suggest (see Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978; Layard, 2006), the
second and third effects suggests it should be lower.
To assess the balance of these considerations we adopt a more explicit functional form
whereby:
I. The utility function is separable in (i) a tradition subutility function of consumption
1Anything that causes an individual with a given wage rate to work harder causes all such individuals to
work harder. This increases peer consumption, which in turn increases labour supply and so on.
2Where equity considerations are captured through the negative of the covariance between gross earnings
and the net social marginal value of income; whilst efficiency considerations are captured through a weighted
average of the compensated labour supply elasticity.
3A somewhat related paper to ours is the unpublished paper Beath and FitzRoy (2011). They too
examine the optimal income tax rate when individuals compare their income to that of those with the same
productivity, and consequently consider Nash equilibria. However, their paper differs from ours in a number
of crucial respects: (i) they use a particular functional form for the utility function - e.g. quasi-linear in
leisure; (ii) despite the fact that, in their model, all unemployment is voluntary they assume that the way
the unemployed compare their income to that of their peers is different from the way the unemployed do so;
(iii) they have no universal benefit.
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 and leisure which we term the well-offness function; and (ii) a function of relative
consumption which we term subjective well-being. By varying the relative weight θ
that is given to subjective well-being we can nest the traditional policy framework -
which is concerned solely with well-offness - as a special case (θ = 0) and see how the
optimal tax rate varies with θ.
II. Moreover, through a separate parameter, χ, we treat parametrically the extent to which
peer consumption - which enters solely through the subjective well-being function -
exercises a pure negative effect on utility (χ = 0) or also exercises a KUJ behavioural
effect on labour supply (χ > 0).
A notable property of this functional form is that because an individual’s own consumption
enters both the well-offness and subjective well-being functions, the overall weight given to
consumption in utility can potentially vary as we change the relative weight, θ, given to
subjective well-being. To account for this, we also numerically simulate results for an alter-
native subjective well-being function that is decreasing in peer consumption and independent
of own consumption.
Overall, we find that (i) the optimal tax rate increases in θ, where we note that θ = 0 yields
the well-documented results from Stern (1976); but (ii) decreases with χ for any θ ∈ (0, 1].
The intuition for the first observation is that an increase in θ increases the weight individuals
place on subjective well-being and, in turn the size of the negative externality and labour
distortion. As indicated by our optimal tax expression, the larger the distortion the larger
the corrective role for taxation. The intuition for the second observation also follows directly
from our optimal tax expression. An increase in χ increases the extent to which labour supply
depends on peer consumption, in turn increasing the size of the KUJ multiplier effects at
the optimum. These multiplier effects thus increase the responsiveness of individual gross
earnings to taxation, in turn reducing the role of the income tax due to heightened efficiency
considerations. In addition, we find that the absolute covariance between gross earnings and
the net smvi is decreasing in the weight individuals place on relative consumption whenever
the social welfare function exhibits concern for inequality in utility levels. This suggests that
equity considerations are indeed muted relative to the standard framework.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 sets out the general framework,
determines the key properties of the Nash equilibrium and derives the optimal linear income
tax; Section 3 numerically simulates the optimal income tax for a specific functional form
that embeds the traditional model as a special case; and finally Section 4 concludes the
paper.
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 2 General Framework
2.1 The Model and Individual Behaviour
Suppose that we have an economy in which:
(i) There is a linear income tax system in place under which all income is taxed at the
rate t ∈ (0, 1) and all individuals receive a tax-free universal benefit, σ > 0.
(ii) Individuals have identical preferences represented by u(c, l, c¯), which depend on con-
sumption, c ≥ 0; leisure, l ∈ [0, 1]; and the average consumption of the individual’s
peers, c¯ ≥ 0. We assume that u is strictly decreasing in c¯, but increasing and concave
in c and l for all values of c¯. Formally, where subscripts denote partial derivatives these
assumptions correspond to:4
uc¯ < 0 ; whilst ∀ c¯ : uc > 0 , ul > 0 , ucc < 0 , ull < 0 , uccull − u2cl > 0
Further, both c and l are normal goods, i.e. ucull − ulucl < 0 and ulucc − ucucl < 0.
(iii) All individuals are able to work but differ in their productive abilities, as reflected in
their gross wage rate, n ≥ 0; and hence in their net wage rate, ω = n(1− t).
In this subsection and the next we treat the parameters (t, σ) as fixed and so conduct the
analysis in terms of the net wage rate, ω.
Individual Labour Supply. In making their labour supply decisions, individuals operate
in the standard Nash fashion: they choose their labour supply taking as given the average
consumption level of their peers, c¯. Individual labour supply therefore satisfies
h∗(ω, σ, c¯) = arg max
h∈[0,1]
u(σ + ωh, 1− h, c¯) (1)
and is characterised by:
ω ≤ ul (σ + ωh
∗, 1− h∗, c¯)
uc (σ + ωh∗, 1− h∗, c¯) , h
∗ ≥ 0 (2)
where the pair of inequalities hold with complementary slackness.
4Throughout this paper subscripts denote partial derivatives.
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 One can readily establish from (2) that the reservation wage is given by
ω˜(σ, c¯) =
ul(σ, 1, c¯)
uc(σ, 1, c¯)
(3)
where h∗ = 0 ∀ ω ≤ ω˜, but h∗ > 0 otherwise.
The consumption and indirect utility functions associated with the labour supply function
characterised in (2) are, respectively:
c∗(ω, σ, c¯) = σ + ωh∗(ω, σ, c¯) ≥ σ (4)
v(ω, σ, c¯) = u [σ + ωh∗(ω, σ, c¯), 1− h∗(ω, σ, c¯), c¯] > 0 (5)
By the Envelope Theorem, the indirect utility function will have the following proper-
ties:
vσ(ω, σ, c¯) = uc [σ + ωh
∗(ω, σ, c¯), 1− h∗(ω, σ, c¯), c¯] > 0
vω(ω, σ, c¯) = vσ(ω, σ, c¯) · h∗(ω, σ, c¯) ≥ 0
vc¯(ω, σ, c¯) = uc¯ [σ + ωh
∗(ω, σ, c¯), 1− h∗(ω, σ, c¯), c¯] < 0
(6)
where the second expression is Roy’s identity.
By the definition of the reservation wage it follows from the standard theory that:
(i) ∀ ω ≤ ω˜(σ, c¯) : h∗(ω, σ, c¯) = 0 ; c∗(ω, σ, c¯) ≡ σ ; v(ω, σ, c¯) ≡ u(σ, 1, c¯)
(ii) ∀ ω > ω˜(σ, c¯) : h∗(ω, σ, c¯) > 0⇒ vω(ω, σ, c¯) > 0 ; h∗σ(ω, σ, c¯) < 0 ;
c∗ω(ω, σ, c¯) > 0 ; c
∗
σ(ω, σ, c¯) > 0
Given our assumption that u is strictly concave in c and l for all values of c¯, one can readily
show that vσσ < 0. Further, given that leisure is a normal good, it follows immediately from
Roy’s identity in (6) that:
vωσ = vσσh
∗ + vσh∗σ ≤ 0 (7)
The inequality is strict for wage rates above the reservation wage (i.e. ω > ω˜), such that the
marginal utility of income is decreasing in the net wage rate for workers.
7
                             8 / 37
 Finally, in this subsection we specify how behaviour is affected by peer consumption, c¯, and
examine two alternative approaches.
1. Pure Negative Externality. If, similarly to Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), individual
preferences are separable in (c, l) and c¯, the functions h∗(ω, σ, c¯), c∗(ω, σ, c¯) and ω˜(σ, c¯)
will no longer depend on c¯ and can instead be simply written as h∗(ω, σ), c∗(ω, σ) and
ω˜(σ), respectively.5 It does, of course, continue to hold that vc¯(ω, σ, c¯) < 0. In this
case we say that peer consumption exerts a pure negative externality.
2. Keeping Up with the Joneses. Consistent with the idea of Keeping Up with the
Joneses (KUJ), it is perhaps more natural to assume that peer consumption also exerts
a behavioural externality that induces individuals to work harder than they otherwise
would. More specifically, when what we call the KUJ effect is in operation, an increase
in peer consumption will (i) cause the reservation wage to fall, thus inducing some
individuals who would have not otherwise worked to start working; whilst (ii) cause
those who already do work to work more intensively. Formally:
ω˜c¯(σ, c¯) < 0 and ∀ ω > ω˜(σ, c¯) : hc¯(ω, σ, c¯) > 0⇒ cc¯(ω, σ, c¯) > 0. (8)
However, by the Envelope Theorem the effect of a marginal increase in peer consump-
tion on welfare is still as specified in the last line of (6).
Note that in both cases, individual labour supply will differ from what the individual would
choose were they to recognise the interplay between their own choices and the level of peer
consumption. We return to this point in Section 2.2.1.
2.2 Nash Equilibrium
In this paper we assume that the relevant peers to whom individuals compare themselves
are those with the same productivity - and hence the same wage rate. Since individuals are
assumed to have identical preferences, the level of consumption that is commonly chosen
in response to a given peer level of consumption will be, in equilibrium, the peer level of
consumption. Therefore, for each net wage, ω, can can define the Nash equilibrium level of
consumption, cN(ω, σ), by the condition that:
5It follows from (2) that the pure negative externality case will arise whenever ul/uc is independent of c¯.
This will be the case if (i) ucc¯ = 0 and ulc¯ = 0; or (ii) ul = g
l(c, l) · k(c¯) and uc = gc(c, l) · k(c¯), where gi and
k are functions.
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 Figure 1: Nash Equilibrium Consumption.
c¯0
c
c = c¯
c∗(ω, σ, c¯)
c¯N
cN(ω, σ)
Notes. This figure graphically illustrates the purpose of assuming c∗c¯ [ω, σ, c
N (ω, σ)] < 1 .
cN(ω, σ) ≡ c∗ [ω, σ, cN(ω, σ)] (9)
In all that follows we assume that for all (ω, σ) ≥ 0 there is a unique solution to (9). It is
easy to see that this implies:
c∗c¯
[
ω, σ, cN(ω, σ)
]
< 1 (10)
Figure 1 graphically illustrates this assumption. When peer consumption exerts a pure
negative externality then c∗c¯ ≡ 0, so (10) is automatically satisfied and (9) just reduces to the
condition cN(ω, σ) ≡ c∗(ω, σ). However, when the KUJ effect is in operation then c∗c¯ > 0
and so the requirement in (10) has more force. Moreover, if we differentiate (9) totally w.r.t.
ω and σ we obtain:
cNx (ω, σ) =
c∗x
(
ω, σ, cN(ω, σ)
)
(1− c∗¯c)
> 0 , x = ω, σ (11)
So when the KUJ effect is in operation, there are multiplier effects at work on consump-
tion and consequently anything that causes a change in individual consumption will have a
magnified impact on Nash consumption.6
The Nash consumption level is of course determined by the Nash labour supply function,
6Notice that c∗ω = ω + ωh
∗
ω > 0 is guaranteed by our assumption that ulucl − ucull > 0.
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 which we define by:
hN(ω, σ) = h∗
[
ω, σ, cN(ω, σ)
]
(12)
From (2) and (3), the Nash labour supply function is characterised by the first-order-
condition:
ω ≤ ul
(
σ + ωhN , 1− hN , σ + ωhN)
uc (σ + ωhN , 1− hN , σ + ωhN) , h
N ≥ 0 (13)
where the pair of inequalities hold with complementary slackness. The associated Nash
reservation wage is:
ω˜N(σ) ≡ ul(σ, 1, σ)
uc(σ, 1, σ)
Once more, if peer consumption exerts a pure negative externality then hN(ω, σ) ≡ h∗(ω, σ)
and ω˜N(σ) ≡ ω˜(σ).
Finally, the level of individual well-being in the Nash equilibrium is given by the Nash indirect
utility function:
vN(ω, σ) = v
[
ω, σ, cN(ω, σ)
]
(14)
Before proceeding, notice that if ω ≤ ω˜(σ) then vN(ω, σ) ≡ u(σ, 1, σ) ⇒ vNσ = uc + uc¯; but
if ω > ω˜N then - by differentiating (14) totally w.r.t. σ - we have vNσ = uc + uc¯c
N
σ . At this
level of generality, in neither case is it obvious that the marginal (Nash) utility of income
is positive. While there may be interesting policy implications that arise through pursuing
further the possibility of a non-positive marginal utility of income, given the other issues we
wish to pursue we simply assume in all that follows that:
vNσ (ω, σ) > 0 ∀ ω, σ ≥ 0 (15)
We now establish four key properties of the Nash-equilibrium which, as we will subsequently
show in subsection 1.3, have important implications for the optimal income tax rate.
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 2.2.1 Inefficiency of Nash Equilibrium
Given the symmetric Nash equilibrium in which individuals of the same productivity have
the same consumption, it is immediately clear that the individual endeavour to raise their
consumption relative to that of their peers is self-defeating. A social planner would recognise
this externality and, taking as given the linear tax system in place, labour supply would be
chosen to maximise u(σ + ωh, 1− h, σ + ωh). Formally, let
hS(ω, σ) ≡ arg max
h∈[0,1]
u(ωh, 1− h, σ + ωh)
be the level of labour supply that would result were individuals to recognise that peer con-
sumption will coincide with own consumption in equilibrium. Formally, this is characterised
by:
ω
[
1 +
uc¯
(
σ + ωhS, 1− hS, σ + ωhS)
uc (σ + ωhS, 1− hS, σ + ωhS)
]
≤ ul
(
σ + ωhS, 1− hS, σ + ωhS)
uc (σ + ωhS, 1− hS, σ + ωhS) h
S ≥ 0 (16)
A comparison of (13) and (16) confirms that the Nash equilibrium labour supply is subop-
timal - i.e. hN(ω, σ) 6= hS(ω, σ). Intuitively, because individuals treat peer consumption
as fixed, their labour supply decision is distorted away from that which they would choose
upon recognising that in equilibrium c = c¯. It is also straightforward to show that, as with
all externalities, the distortion can in principle be corrected by imposing a Pigovian tax on
net income at the rate
τˆS = −uc¯
(
σ + ωhS, 1− hS, σ + ωhS)
uc (σ + ωhS, 1− hS, σ + ωhS) > 0 (17)
and using the resulting tax revenue raised (on individuals with wage rate ω) to increase the
lump-sum benefit they receive to σS = σ + τˆSωhS.7 So we have:
Result 1. For every net wage rate, ω, uncorrected Nash equilibrium labour supply is subop-
timal, i.e. hN(ω, σ) ≡ hS(ω, σ). The distortion causing this can be corrected by a Pigovian
tax on net income at the rate τS > 0 as specified in (17), with a corresponding adjustment
7This adjustment to the lump-sum benefit is necessary to ensure that consumption in the social optimum
is the same as in the Nash Equilibrium once the Pigovian tax has been imposed. This is not discussed in
Layard (2006).
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 to the lump-sum benefit. Formally, hS[ω, σ) = hN
[
ω(1− τS), σS]
This result generalises the argument of Layard (2006) to an economy where individuals
differ in their productivity, and where there may be a linear income tax schedule in force for
revenue-raising/redistributional purposes. Notice that:
(i) The corrective Pigovian tax is applied to net income and so is imposed on top of any
other taxes on income that are in place for other reasons.
(ii) Both the Pigovian tax rate and the adjustment to unearned income can in principle
vary with ω.
Notice also that the distortion responsible for the sub-optimality arises because of the neg-
ative effect of peer consumption on utility and does not rely on any KUJ effects of peers
consumption on behaviour. Indeed, it will arise whenever uc¯ < 0.
In what follows let
δN(ω, σ) = −uc¯
(
σ + ωhN , 1− hN , σ + ωhN)
uc (σ + ωhN , 1− hN , σ + ωhN) > 0 (18)
be the uncorrected labour supply distortion in the Nash equilibrium.
2.2.2 Well-Being Decreases in the Net Wage for Low Wage Workers
Notice that if ω ≤ ω˜N(σ) then hN ≡ 0 ⇒ cN ≡ σ ⇒ vN ≡ u(σ, 1, σ). So, unsurprisingly,
well-being is independent of the net wage rate for non-workers. Now consider how well-being
changes with the net wage for those with ω > ω˜N : differentiating (14) w.r.t. ω and making
use of (6),(11) and (17) yields
vNω = vσ + vc¯ · cNω = vσ
[
hN − δN(ω, σ) · cNω
]
(19)
This shows that an increase in the net wage rate has two effects on the Nash level of individual
well-being:
(i) It makes individuals better off by increasing the income available for spending on
consumption or leisure, with the rate of increase in income being proportional to hours
worked (Roy’s identity);
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 Figure 2: Nash Indirect Wellbeing over the net wage continuum.
ω0
vN
ω˜N (σ)
vN
Notes. This figure graphically illustrates Result 2. Nash Indirect well-being is falling in ability for workers
with ω ≈ ω˜N (σ) and thus hN ≈ 0.
(ii) However, it makes individuals worse off by increasing peer income an so intensifying
the distortionary effect on labour supply to which concerns over peer income give rise.
But now we get the following:
Result 2. If ω > ω˜N and ω ≈ ω˜N(σ) then ∂v
N
∂σ
< 0.
Proof : ω ≈ ω˜N(σ)⇒ hN(ω, σ) ≈ 0⇒ vNω ≈ −vσ ·δN(ω, σ)·cNω < 0, where the final inequality
follows from (6),(11) and (17). 
This generalises the result in Ulph (2014), which was proved for a specific functional form
similar to that we will employ below in Section 3. The immediate implication of Result 2 is
that, contrary to the traditional theory, the worst off in society are no longer those of lowest
productivity or the unemployed.
To facilitate our derivation of the optimal tax rate in Section 3, we totally differentiate (14)
w.r.t. σ to obtain:
vNσ = vσ
(
1− δN · cNσ
)
(20)
We can then combine (19) and (20) to obtain what we term the distortion-adjusted Roy’s
identity :
vNω = v
N
σ
[
hN −
(
δN · ccNω
1− δN · cNσ
)]
(21)
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 where ccNω is the compensated effect of an increase in the net wage on Nash consumption.
8
Notice that the second term within square brackets is a monotonically increasing function
of the distortion to labour supply decisions, δN .
2.2.3 Multiplier Effects on Compensated Labour Supply
As noted, when peer consumption exerts a pure negative externality then hN(ω, σ) ≡ h∗(ω, σ),
so Nash labour supply behaves in exactly the same way as individual labour supply. So con-
sider what happens when the peer consumption exerts a behavioural KUJ effect. In this
case we re-write (12) as:
hN(ω, σ) = h∗[ω, σ, σ + ωhN(ω, σ)] (22)
Differentiating (22) totally w.r.t. ω and σ then gives:
hNω = hω + hc¯
[
hN + ωhNω
]
(23)
hNσ = hσ + hc¯
[
1 + ωhNσ
]
(24)
Multiplying (24) by hN and subtracting the result from (23) then yields:
hcNω =
(
hNω − hN · hNσ
)
=
(
h∗ω − hN · hNσ
)
(1− c∗¯c)
=
hcω
(1− c∗c¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Multiplier Effect
(25)
where we have made use of the fact that c∗c¯ = ωh
∗
c¯ . When the KUJ effect is in operation we
know that at the Nash consumption level 0 < c∗c¯ < 1. We have thus proved:
Result 3. When peer consumption exerts a behavioural KUJ effect on individual behaviour,
the effect of an increase in the net wage on compensated Nash labour supply is a multiple
> 1 of its effect on compensated individual labour supply.
For later purposes it will be helpful to express this relationship in elasticity form, so let:
8One can readily establish from (19) and (20) that:
vNω
vNσ
=
hN − δNcNω
1− δNcNσ
= hN −
[
hN − h
N − δNcNω
1− δNcNσ
]
= hN −
(
δN (cNω − hNcNσ )
1− δNcNσ
)
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 ηcN =
ωhcNω
hN
; ηc =
ωhcω
hN
be, respectively, the Nash compensated individual labour supply elasticity and the compen-
sated individual labour supply elasticity, both calculated at the Nash level of labour supply.
Then it readily follows that (25) becomes:
ηcNω =
ηcω
(1− c∗¯c)
(26)
The Nash compensated labour supply elasticity is thus a multiple (greater than 1) of the
compensated labour supply elasticity. One can anticipate how this multiplier effect will
heighten the efficiency considerations in the optimal tax expression presented below in section
2.3.
2.2.4 Marginal utility of income not necessarily decreasing in the net wage.
As established, both well-being and the marginal indirect utility of income are independent
of the wage rate for those with ω ≤ ω˜N(σ). So let us consider how the marginal utility of
income changes with the wage rate for those with ω > ω˜N(σ), and thus those who work.
Since vNωσ = v
N
σω, we differentiate (19) w.r.t. σ to obtain:
vNωσ = vωσ︸︷︷︸
<0
+vωc¯c
N
ω + vc¯c
N
ωσ (27)
As shown in (7), the first term on the right side of (27) is negative - i.e. the conventional
result. However, the signs of the second and third terms are ambiguous, thus rendering the
overall sign of (27) unclear.
We now state the following result:
Result 4.
(i) If vωc¯c
N
ω + vc¯c
N
ωσ > −vωσ then vNωσ > 0;
(ii) A sufficient condition for vNωσ > 0 is:
c¯vσc¯
vσ
> − c¯h
∗
c
h∗
and
ωhNωσ
hNσ
> −1
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 Having understood the properties of the Nash equilibria at every wage rate we can now
formulate the optimal tax problem and characterise its solution.
2.3 Optimal Income Tax
In this section the tax parameters (t, σ) are choice variables and so we write everything in
terms of individual productivity, n ≥ 0. We assume that the distribution of productivity in
the population is given by F (n); where F (0) = 0, F ′(n) > 0 ∀ n ≥ 0 and ∫∞
0
dF (n) = 1.
The optimal income tax problem is:
max
t,σ
∫ ∞
0
Ψ
{
vN [n(1− t), σ]} dF (n)
s.t. σ ≤ t
∫ ∞
0
nhN [n(1− t), σ] dF (n) , t ∈ [0, 1] , σ ≥ 0
(28)
where Ψ(·) is a concave transformation of individual well-being that captures society’s views
about inequality of well-being, i.e. Ψ′ > 0 and Ψ′′ < 0. For simplicity we assume taxation
to be purely redistributive and as such there is no revenue requirement.
We denote the solutions to (28) by tˆ and σˆ, and also let λˆ be the associated Lagrange
multiplier attached to the government budget constraint. This latter term will have the
standard interpretation as the social marginal value of public funds.
Assuming an interior solution (i.e. tˆ > 0, σˆ > 0), the first order conditions w.r.t. t and σ
are, respectively:
(t) : λˆN
∫ ∞
0
nhNdF (n) =
∫ ∞
0
{
Ψ′
(
vN
)
nvNω + λˆtn
2hNω
}
dF (n) (29)
(σ) :
∫ ∞
0
[
Ψ′
(
vN
)
vNσ + λˆtˆnh
N
σ
]
dF (n) = λˆ (30)
Analogous to other authors - Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980); Slack (2015); Viard (2001) -
let
φ(n) = Ψ′
{
vN
[
n(1− tˆ), σˆ]} · vNσ [n(1− tˆ), σˆ]+ λˆtˆnhNσ [n(1− tˆ), σˆ] (31)
denote the net social marginal value of income (smvi) of a productivity n individual, here
evaluated at the optimum choices tˆ and σˆ. It immediately follows that (30) reduces to:
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 λˆ =
∫ ∞
0
φ(n)dF (n) (32)
This simply states that the social marginal value of public funds equates with the average
net smvi at the optimum choices (see, for example, Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980).
To save on notation in what follows, we let
z(n) = nhN [n(1− tˆ), σˆ] , z¯ =
∫ ∞
0
z(n)dF (n) , rz(n) =
z(n)
z¯
, rφ(n) =
φ(n)
λˆ
(33)
denote the gross earned income (evaluated at the optimal tax and benefit); average gross
earned income; relative gross earned income and relative net smvi of a productivity n indi-
vidual.
Further, we also let
∆ =
∫∞
0
[
Ψ′(vN)vNσ
]
n
(
δN · ccNω
1− δN · cNσ
)
λˆz¯
(34)
measure the average smvi of the uncorrected distortions to individual labour supply, evalu-
ated relative to aggregate gross earnings valued at the shadow price of public funds. From
(21), the term δNccNω
(
1− δNcNσ
)−1
is the distortion-adjustment that is applied to the con-
ventional Roy’s identity when determining how an increase in the net wage impacts the
well-being of a productivity n individual.9 Multiplying this term by n therefore gives the
foregone income cost of the distortion; and the marginal welfare cost of each unit of income
lost is Ψ′(vN)vNσ .
Putting this all together - i.e. substituting (21),(25),(32),(33) and (34) into (29) - yields the
below result.
Result 5. The optimal tax rate is implicitly characterised by:
tˆ
1− tˆ =
∆− Cov [rz(n), rφ(n)]∫∞
0
rz(n) · η
c
ω
[1− c∗¯c ]
dF (n)
(35)
Proof: See derivation in Appendix.
Expression (35) makes clear that, in contrast to the standard optimal tax expression, there
9Like φ, this is evaluated at the optimal choices tˆ and σˆ.
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 are now three considerations in setting the optimal tax rate: (i) correcting labour distortions,
(ii) the deadweight loss of taxation (efficiency considerations) and (iii) the negative covari-
ance between relative gross earnings and the relative net smvi (equity considerations). The
distortion correcting role is not found in the traditional optimal tax expression (see Atkinson
and Stiglitz, 1980), whilst the latter two considerations will differ from the standard analysis.
We discuss each in turn:
(i) Correcting Distortions. The first term in the numerator of (35) is positive and measures
the average social value of the distortion to labour supply induced by the presence of
peer concerns, as a fraction of the average earned income evaluated at the shadow
price of public funds. This tells us that, in absence of the corrective Pigovian taxes
at every wage rate, the income tax rate has to be higher to correct the distortions on
average. This is analogous to the standard argument for higher tax rates proposed in
the literature (see Boskin and Sheshinski, 1978; Layard, 2006).
(ii) Greater Deadweight Loss. The denominator of (35) captures the fact that - as derived
in Result 3 - the compensated elasticity of Nash labour supply is a multiple (greater
than 1) of the compensated elasticity of individual labour supply. Consequently, a given
rate of income tax is more distortionary than in the standard framework without peer
comparisons, thus suggesting on efficiency grounds that the optimal tax rate should be
lower.
(iii) Muted Inequality Concerns. As is conventionally the case, the equity concerns are
captured in the numerator by negative covariance between (relative) gross earnings
and the (relative) net smvi. Note, however, that:
φ′(n) = (1− tˆ)
{
Ψ′′vNω v
N
σ + Ψ
′vNωσ + λˆtˆnh
N
ωσ
}
+ λˆtˆhNσ
We know from Result 2 that vNω < 0 for wages close to the reservation wage and so the
first term in within curly brackets will be positive for low productivities, thus departing
from the conventional framework.10 Further, Result 4 indicates that vNωσ is no longer
unambiguously negative. Both of these factors suggest that the net smvi may decline
less rapidly with productivity than is conventionally the case. This in turn suggests
that the covariance term in the numerator of (35) may be smaller in absolute magnitude
than in the conventional analysis of optimal taxation, leading ceteris paribus to a lower
tax rate.
10In the strict utilitarian case we have Ψ′′ = 0 and so the first term will be zero because there is no concern
for inequality in utility levels.
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 In summary, the distortion correcting role implies a higher tax rate than in the conventional
analysis; the multiplier effects attached to KUJ effects imply a lower marginal tax rate; and
finally the observation that the net smvi may decline less rapidly with productivity may also
act to lower the tax rate.
To assess the net effect of these considerations and understand more fully how the optimal tax
rate responds to an increase in the weight individuals place on relative income considerations,
we proceed in the next section to adopt a more explicit functional form and undertake
numerical simulations.
3 Specific Functional Forms
In this section we adopt a specific functional form which embeds the traditional framework
as a special case where no weight is placed on relative consumption. Formally, we make the
separability assumption:11
u(c, l, c¯) = [y(c, l)]1−θ
[
s
(c
c¯
)]θ
, 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 (36)
where:
• The function y(c, l) is a conventional utility function that depends on individual con-
sumption and leisure. It captures how ‘well-off’ individuals are and so we call it the
well-offness function.
• The function s(c/c¯) captures subjective well-being: as indicated, it is a function of
relative consumption.
This specification captures directly the concern that traditional policy-making has tended to
ignore subjective well-being and instead focus on what economists have been very successful
at monitoring and understanding: how well-off individuals are. The traditional policy-
making framework is thus nested as a special case where θ = 0. Moreover, for reasons that
will become clear, we henceforth assume that s(c/c¯) takes the form:
s
(c
c¯
)
=
c
c¯
1 + χ · c
c¯
=
c
c¯+ χc
, χ ≥ 0 (37)
11For a similar functional form see Ulph (2014).
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 This captures the idea that, as conventionally measured, subjective well-being can be thought
of as varying on scale between 0 and 1. Further, this information also allows us to readily
link our analysis to the alternative form of separability considered by Boskin and Sheshinski
(1978): i.e. separability between (i) consumption and leisure; and (ii) peer consumption. To
see this, note that we can always set χ = 0 and write (36) as:
u (c, l, c¯) =
[
y(c, l) · c θ1−θ
]1−θ
c¯−θ
This also brings out clearly the fact that, under our chosen specification, varying the rela-
tive weight to subjective well-being and well-offness also varies the relative weight given to
individual consumption vis-a-vis individual leisure in utility.
Under these preferences individual labour supply is characterised by:
n(1− t)
[
1 +
(
θ
1− θ
)(
c¯
χc∗ + c¯
)(
y/c∗
yc
)]
≤ yc
yl
; h∗ ≥ 0 (38)
where the pair of inequalities hold with complementary slackness. As alluded to above, (38)
makes clear that individual labour supply will only be a function of average peer consumption
if χ > 0. Put differently, there will only be KUJ effects when χ > 0.
In turn, the symmetric Nash equilibrium level of labour supply can be characterised by:
ω
[
1 +
(
θ
1− θ
)(
1
1 + χ
)(
y/cN
yc
)]
≤ yl
yc
; hN ≥ 0 (39)
where the pair of inequalities hold with complementary slackness. At an interior solution
one can therefore readily verify that:
∂hN
∂θ
> 0 ,
∂hN
∂χ
< 0 (40)
The size of the labour distortion is thus increasing in the weight that individuals give to
relative consumption, θ. Indeed, were individuals to recognise that in equilibrium their own
consumption would coincide with that of their peers, such that s = 1, they would simply
choose to maximise the conventional well-offness function (which corresponds to the case
where θ = 0). Contrastingly, equilibrium labour supply is decreasing in χ.
With the properties established in (40) serving by way of background, we proceed to the
numerical analysis.
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 3.1 Numerical Simulations
In line with much of the optimal income tax literature, we let individual well-offness take
the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form (see Stern, 1976; Viard, 2001; Immonen
et al., 1998):
y(c, l) =
[
αc
ρ−1
ρ + (1− α)l ρ−1ρ
]
; ρ 6= 1 (41)
where ρ denotes the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption.
With respect to the social welfare function in (28), we assume that preferences for equality
of individual well-being are captured by the function:
Ψ(v) =

v1−
1−   ≥ 0,  6= 1
ln(v)  = 1
(42)
where  is the Atkinson inequality aversion parameter. Notice that  = 0 corresponds to the
strict utilitarian case where equity concerns are restricted to inequality in the social marginal
utility of income.
The parameter choices are as follows: n ∼ N (mean = −1, s.d. = 0.39); α = 0.614,
ρ ∈ {0.5, 0.99}; χ ∈ {0, 0.5, 1}12;  ∈ {0, 2, 3} and θ ∈ [0, 0.3]. These parameters are in-
tentionally chosen to allow comparability between our results and the major existing studies
in the optimal income tax literature, in particular Stern (1976). The assumption that pro-
ductivity is lognormally distributed with mean and standard deviations of lnn set at -1 and
0.39, respectively, has been the benchmark since Mirrlees (1971). The range of values of
ρ fall within those from major studies, with ρ = 0.5 being the most empirically plausible
(Viard, 2001). Analogous to Stern (1976), α is chosen such that the average productivity
individual (n = 0.3969) works two-thirds of their time endowment when θ = 0, ρ = 0.5 and
t = σ = 0. We view the choices of θ as corresponding to moderate concerns for relative
consumption.
As indicated by our choices of (θ, χ), we decompose the effects of the model parameters by
simulating the following optimal tax rates, tˆ(θ, χ):
(i) Baseline Case. The optimal tax rate tˆ(0, 0) is that which arises when all that matters
12Note that there is no upper bound on the parameter χ.
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 is well-offness and so:13
u(c, l, c¯) = y(c, l)
(ii) Negative Externality and KUJ Effects. The optimal tax rates tˆ(θ, χ) with χ ∈ {0.5, 1}
for our preferred specification where peer comparisons induce both a negative exter-
nality and KUJ effects:
u(c, l, c¯) = [y(c, l)]1−θ
(
c
χc+ c¯
)θ
; χ ∈ {0.5, 1}
(iii) Pure Negative Externality. The optimal tax rate function tˆ(θ, 0) that arises when χ = 0
and so peer consumption has a pure negative externality effect, and so:
u(c, l, c¯) = [y(c, l)]1−θ
(c
c¯
)
(iv) Pure Negative Externality with no additional weight on consumption. The optimal tax
rate function tˆalt(θ) that arises when, as in (iii) above, peer consumption has a pure
negative externality but the weight given to consumption vis-a`-vis leisure is unaffected
by the weight given to peer income, so:
u(c, l, c¯) = [y(c, l)]1−θ c¯−θ
So we end up with the following decomposition of the change in the optimal tax rate brought
about by recognising the importance of relative income to individuals:
tˆ(θ, χ)− tˆ(0, 0) = [tˆalt(θ)− tˆ(0, 0)]+ [tˆ(θ, 0)− tˆalt(θ)]+ [tˆ(θ, χ)− tˆ(θ, 0)] (43)
The first term on the right side captures the impact on the optimal tax rate of the pure
negative welfare externality that arises when individuals have concerns over relative income.
This should be positive because we need a higher income tax to correct the externality, thus
capturing the Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) argument for higher taxes. The second term
captures the fact in the pure negative externality version of our specification - as opposed to
that generating tˆalt - an increase in the weight placed on relative consumption also increases
the weight given to individual consumption vis-a`-vis leisure. Finally, the third term captures
the effect of having peer consumption generate KUJ behavioural effects on labour supply
13Note that tˆ(0, 0) = tˆ(0, χ) ∀ χ because the optimal tax function is independent of χ when θ = 0.
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 Figure 3: Variation of tˆ(θ, δ) with θ and χ.
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Notes. Subplots (a), (b) and (c) are generated for the CES parameter ρ = 0.5; whilst subplots (d), (e) and
(f) are generated for ρ = 0.99. When θ = 0 the optimal tax rates correspond to those in Stern (1976): I.e.
in subplot (a) tˆ(0, 0) = 0.192; (b) tˆ(0, 0) = 0.428; (c) tˆ(0, 0) = 0.478; (d) tˆ(0, 0) = 0.126; (e) tˆ(0, 0) = 0.291;
and (f) tˆ(0, 0) = 0.333.
and, as indicated, should be negative.
The numerical results are presented graphically in Figure 3. Subplots (a), (b) and (c) are
generated for ρ = 0.5; whilst subplots (d),(e) and (f) are generated for ρ = 0.99 (i.e. approx-
imately Cobb-Douglas). On the horizontal axis in each subplot the parameter θ is varied in
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 discrete increments of 0.01 from 0 to 0.3; where for each value of θ the optimal tax functions
tˆ(θ, χ) and tˆalt are simulated. The different curves within each subplot correspond to the
different tax specifications specified above: tˆ(0, 0), tˆ(θ, 1), tˆ(θ, 0.5), tˆ(θ, 0) and tˆalt.
The key observations are as follows. First, the functions tˆ(θ, χ) and tˆalt(θ) are increasing
in θ; and thus in the weight that individuals place on relative consumption/subjective well-
being considerations. The intuition here is provided by the ∆ term in the numerator of the
optimal tax expression in (35): (i) the distortion to labour supply induced by taking peer
consumption as given leads to a corrective role for taxation; and further (ii) to the extent
that an increase in θ increases labour supply and thus the size of the distortion, it also
increases the corrective role for the tax rate. Indeed, we know from (40) that Nash labour
supply is increasing in θ.
Second, for any given θ > 0 we observe:
tˆ(0, 0) < tˆ(θ, χ = 1) < tˆ(θ, χ = 0.5) < tˆ(θ, χ = 0)
The optimal tax rate is thus decreasing in χ. The intuition is twofold: (i) when χ > 0
there are KUJ effects which, as illustrated in the denominator of (35), act to heighten the
efficiency consequences of taxation; and (ii) we know from (40) that Nash labour supply is
decreasing in χ, thus reducing the size of the labour distortion.
Given our postulate that equity considerations will be muted due to Result 2 - which states
that the level of indirect utility is decreasing in the wage for workers with wages close to
the reservation wage - it is of interest to see how the covariance between gross earnings and
the net smvi changes with the weight, θ, that individuals place on subjective well-being.
Figure 4 illustrates this and is composed of three subplots which differ in their distributional
weights. In subplot (a) we have the strict utiliarian case ( = 0) and so the net smvi is
independent of utility levels. We here observe that the covariance becomes more negative
with θ. Contrastingly, in subplots (b) and (c) we have  = 2 and  = 3 respectively, and
so the net smvi is a function of the utility level. Result 2 now has force: we observe that
the covariance between gross earnings and the net smvi becomes less negative with θ and so
equity considerations are indeed muted relative to the standard framework.
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 Figure 4: Equity considerations: covariance between gross earnings and the net smvi.
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Notes. To generate this figure we set t = 0.2 and calculate the σ that exhausts the budget constraint. The
net smvi is (vN )−vNσ + λtnh
N
σ ; where λ is the root to the expression
∫∞
0
{(vN )−vNσ + λtnhNσ }dF = λ.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper has developed a framework in which to analyse optimal linear income taxation
when individual preferences give weight to subjective well-being: here taken to be how one’s
own consumption compares with that of their immediate (same ability) peers. We have shown
that when individuals compare themselves to their peers there are three factors that suggest
the optimal tax rate will differ from that proposed under a conventional framework.
(i) Distortion Correcting Role. Through treating peer consumption as given, individual
labour supply decisions are distorted away from what they would choose were they to
recognise that in equilibrium their own consumption will coincide with that of their
peers. The optimal income tax rate is increasing in the size of this distortion.
(ii) Heightened Efficiency considerations. When peer concerns exercise a Keeping up with
the Joneses effect on labour supply, individual labour supply is a function of peer
consumption. In equilibrium compensated labour elasticities exhibit a multiplier effect:
person A working harder raises peer consumption which in turn induces person B to
work harder and so forth. This means that the distortionary effect of taxation is higher
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 than in the traditional framework, thus pointing to a lower optimal tax rate.
(iii) Muted Inequality concerns. Inequality concerns - as captured through the negative
covariance between (relative) gross earnings and the (relative) net smvi - may be muted
relative to the standard policy framework. In our framework individual well-being is
decreasing in the wage rate for workers with wages close to the reservation wage. To the
extent that this reduces the rate at which the net smvi falls with productivity, it may
lower the absolute value of the covariance. We have shown that an important factor here
will be whether or not the social welfare function gives weight to inequality in utility
levels. Whilst the result that well-being may fall with wage was first demonstrated in
Ulph (2014) for a specific functional form, we have shown here that holds in general.
The worst-off in society are thus no longer those with the lowest wage, nor are they
the unemployed. These muted inequality concerns suggest a lower tax rate relative to
the traditional framework.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to (i) establish the importance of
these second two effects in determining the optimal tax rate; and (ii) capture all three
effects in a general optimal tax framework. Our numerical analysis embeds the tradtional
framework (see Stern, 1976) as a special case and demonstrates that when all three effects
are present the optimal tax rate is increasing in the weight individuals place on relative
consumption. However, the heightened efficiency considerations embodied in the second
effect (and potentially the muted inequality considerations in the third) draw the optimal
tax rate closer to that emerging from a traditional policy framework, as well as reducing the
rate at which it increases with the weight given to relative consumption.
There are a number of extensions that we intend to pursue. First, we have drawn on recent
empirical evidence that individuals make relative income comparisons in the narrow sense:
i.e. with colleagues/relatives/friends who are very similar to themselves. We have interpreted
this in a very extreme way of meaning others who are identical in terms of ability: this has the
attractive feature of providing a clear counterfactual of how individuals would behave were
they to recognise that the equilibrium will be symmetric. However, an alternative analysis
to undertake would determine the optimal tax rates when individuals make the broadest
comparison and care about their income relative to that in the population at large.14 This
would strip out much of the Nash-equilibrium considerations arising in Section 2.2 and so
much of the source of the second and third factors identified above. Accordingly, such an
analysis would serve as a useful counterfactual against which to compare optimal tax rates
14The paper by Beath and FitzRoy (2011) referred to in footnote 3 also contains a comparison with the
case where individuals make the broadest of comparisons.
26
                            27 / 37
 from both the traditional framework and that identified here.
A second direction for research is to consider other formulations that lie intermediate be-
tween the very strict interpretation of peer comparisons considered here and the broadest
comparison discuss above. We postulate that many of the features and conclusions of the
existing framework will carry over to this more general setting.
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Appendices
A Derivation of the optimal tax expression.
To derive the optimal tax expression in (35) we substitute into the first-order-condition for
t, (29), both (i) the distortion-adjusted Roy’s identity from (21) and (ii) the equation for
compensated Nash labour supply from (25). This yields:
λˆ
∫ ∞
0
nhNdF (n) =
∫ ∞
0
{
Ψ′(vN)nvNσ
[
hN −
(
δNccNω
1− δNcNω
)]
+ λˆN tn2
(
hcNω + h
NhNσ
)}
dF (n)
=
∫ ∞
0
{
nhN
[
Ψ′(vN)vσ + λˆtˆnhNσ
]
−Ψ′(vN)nvNσ
(
δNccNω
1− δNcNω
)}
dF (n)
+ λˆtˆ
∫ ∞
0
n2hcNω dF (n)
(A.1)
Substituting into (A.1) the definition of φ(n) from (31) then yields∫ ∞
0
{
nhN
[
1− φ(n)
λˆ
]
+
Ψ′(vN)nvNσ
λˆ
(
δNccNω
1− δNcNω
)}
dF (n) = tˆ
∫ ∞
0
n2hcNω dF (n) (A.2)
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 To save on notation we let z = nhN and z¯ =
∫∞
0
nhNdF . Dividing both sides of (A.2) by z¯
and rearranging then yields:∫ ∞
0
{
z
z¯
[
1− φ(n)
λˆ
]
+
Ψ′(vN)nvNσ
λˆ · z¯
(
δNccNω
1− δNcNω
)}
dF (n) =
tˆ
1− tˆ
∫ ∞
0
z
z¯
( ω
hN
hcNω
)
dF (n)
(A.3)
Substituting into (A.3) the definitions rz,rφ and λˆ from (33) and (32) then finally gives:
tˆ
1− tˆ =
∆− Cov [rz(n), rφ(n)]∫∞
0
rz(n) · η
c
ω
[1− cc¯]dF (n)

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 Supplementary Appendices for ‘Optimal Taxation and
Subjective Well-being’[NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
Sean Slack & David Ulph
A Properties of the specific functional form
In Section 3 of the main article we make the separability assumption:
u(c, l, c¯) = [y(c, l)]1−θ
[
s
(c
c¯
)]θ
; θ ∈ [0, 1] (A.1)
where y is the standard sub-utility function we refer to as ‘well-offness’, whilst s refers to
subjective well-being and is a function of relative consumption. The parameter θ captures
the weight individuals place on subjective well-being relative to well-offness.
We let:
y(c, l) =
[
αc
ρ−1
ρ + (1− α)l ρ−1ρ
] ρ
ρ−1
(A.2)
s
(c
c¯
)
=
c
χc+ c¯
; χ ≥ 0 (A.3)
Well-offness thus takes the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form, where ρ ∈ (0, 1)
is elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption and α is the weight individuals
place on consumption vis-a`-vis leisure in the CES function.
For computational purposes, the partial derivatives of the CES function are:
yc(c, l) = α
[
α + (1− α)
(c
l
) 1−ρ
ρ
] 1
ρ−1
(A.4)
yl(c, l) = (1− α)
[
α
(
l
c
) 1−ρ
ρ
+ (1− α)
] 1
ρ−1
(A.5)
ycc(c, l) = −
(
1
ρ
)
α(1− α)
[
α + (1− α)
(c
l
) 1−ρ
ρ
] 2−ρ
ρ−1 (c
l
) 1−2ρ
ρ
(
1
l
)
(A.6)
yll(c, l) = −
(
1
ρ
)
α(1− α)
[
α
(
l
c
) 1−ρ
ρ
+ (1− α)
] 2−ρ
ρ−1 (
l
c
) 1−2ρ
ρ
(
1
c
)
(A.7)
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ycl(c, l) =
(
1
ρ
)
α(1− α)
[
α + (1− α)
(c
l
) 1−ρ
ρ
] 2−ρ
ρ−1 (c
l
) 1−ρ
ρ
(
1
l
)
(A.8)
The partial derivatives of the subjective well-being function are:
sc =
c¯
(χc+ c¯)2
; sc¯ = − c
(χc+ c¯)2
; scc = − 2χc¯
(χc+ c¯)3
; sc¯c¯ = − 2c
(χc+ c¯)3
; scc¯ =
χc− c¯
(χc+ c¯)3
(A.9)
Putting this all together, the partial derivatives of the overall well-being function are:
uc(c, l, c¯) = (1− θ)
(
s
y
)θ [
yc +
(
θ
1− θ
)(y
s
)
sc
]
(A.10)
ucc(c, l, c¯) = (1− θ)
(
s
y
)θ
θ
(
ysc − syc
y · s
)[
yc +
(
θ
1− θ
)(y
s
)
sc
]
+ycc +
(
θ
1− θ
)[(
syc − ysc
s2
)
sc +
(y
s
)
scc
]
 (A.11)
ul(c, l, c¯) = (1− θ)
(
s
y
)θ
yl (A.12)
ull(c, l, c¯) = (1− θ)
(
s
y
)θ [
yll − θ
(
y2l
y
)]
(A.13)
uc¯(c, l, c¯) = θ
(y
s
)1−θ
sc¯ (A.14)
ulc¯(c, l, c¯) = θ(1− θ)
(
s
y
)θ−1(
yl
y
)
sc¯ (A.15)
ucc¯(c, l, c¯) = (1− θ)
(
s
y
)θ
θ
(sc¯
s
)[
yc +
(
θ
1− θ
)(y
s
)
sc
]
+
(
θ
1− θ
)[(y
s
)
scc¯ −
( y
s2
)
scsc¯
]
 (A.16)
ulc(c, l, c¯) = (1− θ)
(
s
y
)θ [
θ
(yl
s
)(ysc − syc
y
)
+ ylc
]
(A.17)
Income effect derivative. In order to compute the net smvi we need to know the deriva-
tive hNσ . Differentiating the (interior) f.o.c characterising h
N
ωuc
(
σ + ωhN , 1− hN , σ + ωhN)− ul(σ + ωhN , 1− hN , σ + ωhN
)
= 0
w.r.t. σ yields:
ω
{
(ucc + ucc¯)
(
1 + ωhNσ
)− uclhNσ }− (ucl + ulc¯) (1 + ωhNσ )+ ullhNσ = 0
and thus:
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hNσ =
ω(ucc + ucc¯)− (ucl + ulc¯)
ω(2ucl + ulc¯)− ω2(ucc + ucc¯)− ull (A.18)
=
[
ul(ucc + ucc¯)− uc(ucl + ulc¯)
uc
]
(
ul
uc
)[
(2ucl + ulc¯)−
(
ul
uc
)
(ucc + ucc¯)−
(
uc
ul
)
ull
] (A.19)
Notice immediately that if ucc¯ = ulc¯ = 0 then h
N
σ reduces to the traditionally found in the
literature.
Numerical Code
1
2 from __future__ import division
3 import numpy as np
4 from scipy.optimize import minimize
5 from scipy.stats import lognorm
6 from scipy.integrate import quad
7 from scipy.optimize import brenth
8 import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
9
10 #NUMERICAL CODE: SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING,
RELATIVE INCOME AND
11 #OPTIMAL TAXATION.
12
13 #Individual well-being is a function of
’well-offness’,y, and subjective
well-being,h. These two functions are
defined by:
14
15 def y(c,l,a,p):
16 if c<=0:
17 return 0
18 else:
19 return (a*(c**((p-1)/p))+
20 (1-a)*(l**((p-1)/p)))**(p/(p-1))
21
22 def s(c,cbar,chi):
23 if c<=0:
24 return 0
25 else:
26 return (c/(chi*c+cbar))
27
28 #where ’c’ denotes consumption; ’l’ is
leisure, ’a’ is the weight placed on
consumption vis-a-vis leisure in the
well-offness function; ’p’ is
elasticity of substitution between
leisure and consumption the
well-offness function; ’cbar’ is
average peer consumption; and ’chi’
is a non-negative parameter.
29
30 #The overall well-being function is
31 def u(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p):
32 return ((s(c,cbar,chi)**theta)*
33 (y(c,l,a,p)**(1-theta)))
34
35 #where ’theta’ is the weight placed on
subjective well-being.
36
37 #The partial derivatives of the
well-offness function w.r.t. ’c’ and
’l’ are:
38
39 def yc(c,l,a,p):
40 return a*((a+(1-a)*((c/l)**((1-p)/p)))
41 **(1/(p-1)))
42
43 def yl(c,l,a,p):
44 return (1-a)*((a*((l/c)**((1-p)/p))+
45 (1-a))**(1/(p-1)))
46
47 def ycc(c,l,a,p):
48 return
(-(1/p)*a*(1-a)*((a+(1-a)*((c/l)
49 **((1-p)/p)))**(
50 (2-p)/(p-1)))*((c/l)**((1-2*p)/p))*(1/l))
51
52 def yll(c,l,a,p):
53 return
(-(1/p)*a*(1-a)*((a*((l/c)**((1-p)/p))
54 +(1-a))**(
55 (2-p)/(p-1)))*((l/c)**((1-2*p)/p))*(1/c))
3
                            33 / 37
 Supplementary Appendix [NOT FOR PUBLICATION] S.E. Slack & D.Ulph (2016)
56
57 def ycl(c,l,a,p):
58 return ((1/p)*a*(1-a)*((a+(1-a)*((c/l)
59 **((1-p)/p)))**(
60 (2-p)/(p-1)))*((c/l)**((1-p)/p))*(1/l))
61
62 #The partial derivatives of the
subjective well-being function w.r.t.
’c’ and ’cbar’ are:
63
64 def sc(c,cbar,chi):
65 return cbar/((chi*c+cbar)**2)
66
67 def scbar(c,cbar,chi):
68 return -c/((chi*c+cbar)**2)
69
70 def scc(c,cbar,chi):
71 return -2*chi*cbar/((chi*c+cbar)**3)
72
73 def scbarcbar(c,cbar,chi):
74 return -2*c/((chi*c+cbar)**3)
75
76 def sccbar(c,cbar,chi):
77 return (chi*c-cbar)/((chi*c+cbar)**3)
78
79 #The partial derivatives of the overall
well-being function are
80 #thus:
81
82 def uc(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p):
83 return (1-theta)*(((s(c,cbar,chi)/
84 y(c,l,a,p))**(theta))*
85 (yc(c,l,a,p)+(theta/(1-theta))*
86 (y(c,l,a,p)/s(c,cbar,chi))*
87 sc(c,cbar,chi)))
88
89 def ucc(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p):
90 return ((1-theta)*((s(c,cbar,chi)/
91 y(c,l,a,p))**theta)*
92 (theta*((y(c,l,a,p)*sc(c,cbar,chi)
93 -s(c,cbar,chi)*yc(c,l,a,p))/(y(c,l,a,p)*
94 s(c,cbar,chi)))*
95 (yc(c,l,a,p)+(theta/(1-theta))*
96 (y(c,l,a,p)/s(c,cbar,chi))*
97 sc(c,cbar,chi))+ycc(c,l,a,p)+
98 (theta/(1-theta))*
99 (((s(c,cbar,chi)*yc(c,l,a,p)
100 -y(c,l,a,p)*sc(c,cbar,chi))/
101 (s(c,cbar,chi)**2)) *sc(c,cbar,chi)
102 +(y(c,l,a,p)/s(c,cbar,chi))*
103 scc(c,cbar,chi))))
104
105
106 def ul(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p):
107 return
(1-theta)*((s(c,cbar,chi)/y(c,l,a,p))
108 **theta)*yl(c,l,a,p)
109
110 def ull(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p):
111 return
(1-theta)*(((s(c,cbar,chi)/y(c,l,a,p))
112 **theta)*(yll(c,l,a,p)-
113 theta*((yl(c,l,a,p)**2)/y(c,l,a,p))))
114
115 def ucbar(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p):
116 return
theta*((y(c,l,a,p)/s(c,cbar,chi))
117 **(1-theta))*scbar(c,cbar,chi)
118
119 def ulcbar(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p):
120 return
theta*(1-theta)*(((s(c,cbar,chi)
121 /y(c,l,a,p))**(theta-1))
122 *(yl(c,l,a,p)/y(c,l,a,p))*scbar(c,cbar,chi))
123
124 def uccbar(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p):
125 return
(1-theta)*((s(c,cbar,chi)/y(c,l,a,p))**theta)
126 *(theta*(sc(c,cbar,chi)/
127 s(c,cbar,chi))*(yc(c,l,a,p)+
128 (theta/(1-theta))*(y(c,l,a,p)/
129 s(c,cbar,chi))*sc(c,cbar,chi))
130 +(theta/(1-theta))*((y(c,l,a,p)/
131 s(c,cbar,chi))*sccbar(c,cbar,chi)
132 -(y(c,l,a,p)/(s(c,cbar,chi)**2))
133 *sc(c,cbar,chi)*scbar(c,cbar,chi)))
134
135 def ulc(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p):
136 return (1-theta)*((s(c,cbar,chi)/
137 y(c,l,a,p))**theta)*(
138 theta*(yl(c,l,a,p)/s(c,cbar,chi))
139 *((y(c,l,a,p)*sc(c,cbar,chi)
140 -s(c,cbar,chi)*yc(c,l,a,p))/y(c,l,a,p))
141 +ycl(c,l,a,p))
142
143 #Individual labour supply.
144 #The foc characterising individual labour
supply is:
145
146 def foch(h,n,t,sigma,cbar,theta,chi,a,p):
147 return n*(1-t)-(ul(n*(1-t)*h+sigma,
148 1-h,cbar,theta,chi,a,p)
149 /uc(n*(1-t)*h+sigma,1-h,cbar,
150 theta,chi,a,p))
151
152 #The reservation productivity is thus:
153 def reservationn(t,sigma,cbar,
154 theta,chi,a,p):
4
                            34 / 37
 Supplementary Appendix [NOT FOR PUBLICATION] S.E. Slack & D.Ulph (2016)
155 if sigma<=0:
156 return 0
157 else:
158 return(ul(sigma,1,cbar,theta,chi,a,p)/
159 uc(sigma,1,cbar,theta,chi,a,p))/(1-t)
160
161 #For all n exceeding the reservation
productivity, optimal labour supply
is given by the root of ’foch’. So
the optimal labour supply function is:
162 def opth(n,t,sigma,cbar,theta,chi,a,p):
163 if n<=reservationn(t,sigma,cbar,theta,
164 chi,a,p):
165 return 0
166 else:
167 return brenth(foch,0,0.9999,
168 args=(n,t,sigma,cbar,theta,chi,a,p))
169
170 #Indirect well-being is thus given by:
171 def v(n,t,sigma,cbar,theta,chi,a,p):
172 return u(n*(1-t)*opth(n,t,sigma,cbar,
173 theta,chi,a,p)+sigma,
174 1-opth(n,t,sigma,cbar,theta
175 ,chi,a,p),cbar,theta,chi,a,p)
176
177 #~Peer Comparison: Nash Equilibrium~
178 #--------------------------------------------
179
180 #Let cbar be the average consumption of
one’s peers: i.e. those individuals
of the same ability, n. The Nash
Equilibrium level of labour supply -
which we denote by ’hnash’ - is
characterised by the root to the
condition:
181
182 def nashhimplicit(hnash,n,t,sigma,theta,
183 chi,a,p):
184 return hnash-opth(n,t,sigma,n*hnash*
185 (1-t)+sigma,theta,chi,a,p)
186
187 #The Nash Rpervation gross wage is:
188 def
reservationnnash(t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p):
189 if sigma<=0:
190 return 0
191 else:
192 return (ul(sigma,1,sigma,theta,
193 chi,a,p)/
194 uc(sigma,1,sigma,theta,
195 chi,a,p))/(1-t)
196
197 #For n>rpervationnnash the Nash level of
labour supply is given
198 #by the root to nashimplicit:
199
200 def opthnash(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p):
201 if
n<=reservationnnash(t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p):
202 return 0
203 else:
204 return
brenth(nashhimplicit,0,0.9999,
205 args=(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p))
206
207 #The income effect derivative (not
evaluated at the optimal labour
208 #supply) is:
209 def incomeeffect(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p):
210 return (((ul(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p)*
211 (ucc(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p)
212 +uccbar(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p))
213 -uc(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p)*(
214 ulc(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p)
215 +ulcbar(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p)))/
216 uc(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p))/
217 ((ul(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p)/
218 uc(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p))*
219 ((2*ulc(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p)
220 +ulcbar(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p))-
221 (ul(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p)/
222 uc(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p))*
223 (ucc(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p)
224 +uccbar(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p))
225 -(uc(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p)/
226 ul(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p))*
227 ull(c,l,cbar,theta,chi,a,p))))
228
229 #We then substitute Nash labour
supply/consumption into
’incomeeffect’ to obtain the partial
derivative of ’opthnash’ w.r.t.
’sigma’:
230 def optnashsigma(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p):
231 if
n<=reservationnnash(t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p):
232 return 0
233 else:
234 return incomeeffect(n*(1-t)*
235 opthnash(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p)
236 +sigma,1-
237 opthnash(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p),
238 n*(1-t)*opthnash(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p)
239 +sigma,theta,chi,a,p)
240
241 #Nash indirect well-being is:
242 def
nashindirectu(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p):
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243 return u(n*(1-t)*
244 opthnash(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p)+sigma,
245 1-opthnash(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p),
246 n*(1-t)*opthnash(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p)
247 +sigma,theta,chi,a,p)
248
249 def
nashindirectusigma(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p):
250 return ((uc(sigma+n*(1-t)*
251 opthnash(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p),
252 1-opthnash(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p),
253 sigma+n*(1-t)*
254 opthnash(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p)
255 ,theta,chi,a,p)
256 +ucbar(sigma+n*(1-t)*
257 opthnash(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p),
258 1-opthnash(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p),
259 sigma+n*(1-t)*
260 opthnash(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p),
261 theta,chi,a,p))*
262 (1+n*(1-t)*
263 optnashsigma(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p))-
264 ul(sigma+n*(1-t)*
265 opthnash(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p),
266 1-opthnash(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p),
267 sigma+n*(1-t)*
268 opthnash(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p),theta,chi,a,p)
269 *optnashsigma(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p))
270
271 #Social Welfare and the Optimisation
Problem
272 #========================================
273 #Letting ’ep’ denote the distributional
welfare weight, we construct the
social welfare function as follows.
The below function is the nash
indirect utility function raised to
the welfare weight and multiplied the
productivity pdf.
274 def nashindirectupdf(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a
275 ,p,mean,var,ep):
276 return
((1/(1-ep))*(nashindirectu(n,t,sigma,
277 theta,chi,a,p)**(1-ep))*
278 lognorm.pdf(n,var,scale=np.exp(mean)))
279 #Integrating the above function over n
thus gives social welfare:
280 def socialwelfare(t,sigma,theta,chi,a
281 ,p,mean,var,ep):
282 return quad(nashindirectupdf,0,10,
283 args=(t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p,
284 mean,var,ep))[0]
285
286
287 #Individual earnings times by the
distribution pdf are:
288
289 def
earninsgpdf(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p,mean,var):
290 return
(n*opthnash(n,t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p)*
291 lognorm.pdf(n,var,scale=np.exp(mean)))
292 #Integrating the above function over n
gives aggregate earnings:
293 def
aggregateearnings(t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p,mean,var):
294 return quad(earninsgpdf,0,10,
295 args=(t,sigma,theta,chi,a,p,mean,
296 var))[0]
297
298
299 #For any given ’t’, the resulting value
of ’sigma’ is the root to
300 def sigmaforgiventcondition
301 (sigma,t,theta,chi,a,p,mean,var):
302 return
sigma-t*aggregateearnings(t,sigma,
303 theta,chi,a,p,mean,var)
304 #and thus given by
305 def
sigmaforgivent(t,theta,chi,a,p,mean,var):
306 return brenth(sigmaforgiventcondition,
307 0.01,10,
308 args=(t,theta,chi,a,p,mean,var))
309
310
311 #Let the vector x=(x[0],x[1])=(t,sigma)
denote the variables we are
312 #optimising with respect to.
313
314 #Written in terms of the choice variables
the government budget
315 #constraint is:
316 def budget(x,theta,chi,a,p,mean,var,r):
317 return x[0]*aggregateearnings
318 (x[0],x[1],theta,chi,a,p,mean,var)-r
319
320 #The optimisation problem is described by:
321 def
results(theta,chi,a,p,ep,mean,var,r,s0):
322 cons=({’type’:’eq’,
323 ’fun’:lambda x:np.array([x[1]-
324 budget(x,theta,chi,a,p,mean,var,r)])},
325 {’type’:’ineq’,
326 ’fun’:lambda x: np.array([0.95-x[0]])},
327 {’type’:’ineq’,
328 ’fun’:lambda x: np.array([x[0]])},
329 {’type’:’ineq’,
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330 ’fun’:lambda x: np.array([x[1]])})
331 def obj(x,theta,chi,a,p,mean,var,ep):
332 return -socialwelfare(x[0],x[1],
333 theta,chi,a,p,mean,var,ep)
334 res=minimize(obj,
335 [s0,sigmaforgivent(s0,theta,chi,a,p,mean,var)],
336 args=(theta,chi,a,p,mean,var,ep),
337 constraints=cons,method=’SLSQP’,
338 options={’ftol’:1e-10,’disp’:False})
339 return res.x[0],res.x[1]
340
341 #where ’s0’ denotes a starting value in
the search for the optimal
342 #t. Notice also that, via the function
’sigmaforagivent’, the
343 #value of ’s0’ also pins down a value for
’sigma’.
344
345 #Running the below commands exactly
replicates Stern 1976 (see Table 3):
346 """
347 print
results(0,0,0.613537,0.5,0,-1,0.39,0,
0.3)
348 print
results(0,0,0.613537,0.6,0,-1,0.39,0,0.3)
349 print
results(0,0,0.613537,0.7,0,-1,0.39,0,0.3)
350 print
results(0,0,0.613537,0.8,0,-1,0.39,0,0.3)
351 print
results(0,0,0.613537,0.9,0,-1,0.39,0,0.3)
352 print
results(0,0,0.613537,0.99,0,-1,0.39,0,0.3)
353 (0.19161418428268773,
0.048261860362912537)
354 (0.16954033549211536,
0.042013877702567475)
355 (0.15363822035148467,
0.037437739266487489)
356 (0.14179682534545596, 0.03395299261497884)
357 (0.13277474460714653,
0.031218909512964285)
358 (0.12641651761276695,
0.029222167646414807)
359 """
360 #The following function loops over
’theta’, for each ’theta’
361 #printing out ’results’:
362 def resultsloop(chi,a,p,ep,mean,var,r):
363 theta=0
364 while theta<=0.3:
365 print
results(theta,chi,a,p,ep,mean,var,r)[0],
366 theta=theta+0.01
2
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